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abstract  The article is a critical response to Stefán Snævarr’s “Pragmatism 
and Popular Culture: Shusterman, Popular Art, and the Challenge of Visuality.” 
In its first part, I attempt to prove that several of Snævarr’s claims about popu­
lar culture and new media, which form the basic premises of his diagnosis of 
the alleged intellectual decline of the West, are either dubious or wrong. More­
over, in the context of this diagnosis, Snævarr levels some serious accusations 
against Richard Shusterman’s theory of popular culture, which, I believe, are 
ungrounded and do not do justice to the latter’s approach. Henceforth, the 
remainder of the article is devoted to explaining in which aspects Snævarr’s 
interpretation of Richard Shusterman’s theory is misguided.
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I
This article is a response to Stefán Snævarr’s “Pragmatism and Popular 
Culture: Shusterman, Popular Art, and the Challenge of Visuality,” and I 
would like to make it clear from the very beginning that I am convinced, 
and shall try to prove below, that many of the crucial points presented 
in his text are either dubious or wrong.1 Now, I am also aware of the fact 
that in such situations there always emerges a question: why write, and 
then publish, a largely negative text of this kind? Can such an uncompro-
mising criticism ever serve any useful purpose, after all?2 In my opinion, 
it can, at least in this case, and this is mainly because of the following 
two reasons. 
First of all, in his text, Snævarr paints a very bleak picture of today’s 
popular culture and warns the reader that the latter, specifically its vis ual 
aspect, presents a serious threat, not only to so-called higher culture, but 
also to our civilization per se. Of course, we have heard many such warn-
ings in the last decades (to be exact, more or less analogous ones have 
been tirelessly reiterated throughout the entire history of the West) and 
thus most of us should be immune to them.3 Yet, Snævarr’s ar ticle trumps 
many other texts of this kind in terms of gloominess, as he deploys a 
hyperbolically dramatic rhetoric in order to talk about: “the intellectual 
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decline of the West,”4 “the onslaught of popular culture” and the resulting 
“death toll” which embraces more and more people (who, in Neil Post-
man’s formulation, are “amusing [themselves] to death”),5 “the grey fu-
ture” of the world inhabited by the “new barbarians,”6 and “the culture of 
narcissism … being replaced [today] by the culture of autism” and “social 
isolation.”7 Given that all this might have a rather distressing effect on a 
large number of readers, I decided to address some of these predictions 
and lamentations. In the first part of the article, then, I am going to argue 
that many of Snævarr’s claims about popular culture, which form the 
basic premises of his warnings, are unfounded. 
The second reason for my writing this polemical piece is that Snævarr, 
in the context of the aforementioned diagnoses and prognoses, levels 
serious accusations against Richard Shusterman’s aesthetic theory of 
popular culture (even though he at the same finds it “inspiring”).8 These, 
I believe, are again ungrounded and do not do justice to Shusterman’s 
project. Henceforth, in the remainder of the paper, my aim shall be to 
demonstrate in which aspects Snævarr’s interpretation of Richard Shus-
terman’s aesthetics is misguided and to indicate that, despite the overall 
impression one might get from Snævarr’s article, Shusterman’s aesthet-
ics is a useful tool for dealing with popular culture, especially as far as 
aesthetic education is concerned. That latter element actually allows me 
to say that my text is not entirely negative, but has a constructive side, too, 
something which, by the way, is quite appropriate in discussing pragma-
tist aesthetics, as should become clear from what follows. Finally, I will 
also try to indicate that had Snævarr read Shusterman more closely, he 
would have avoided not only the mistakes he made in his interpretation 
of the latter, which is quite obvious, but also those affecting his assess-
ment of the present cultural situation in the West.
To begin with, Snævarr tries to defend his general claim “that popu-
lar culture, especially visual entertainment, could be a danger to educa-
tion … and civilization”9 by arguing for the plausibility of three specific 
hypotheses: that popular culture poses a threat to (a) reading, (b) high 
culture and (c) communal living.10 Moreover, Snævarr uses a, b, and c to 
undermine Shusterman’s aesthetic of popular culture, as these contra-
dict some of its basic premises.
(a) Reading: In defending the plausibility of the first hypothesis, 
Snævarr refers to surveys which indicate, e.g. that the readership of 
“imaginative literature in the United States” has significantly decreased, 
or that the same happened to the readership of books in France, or that 
even “in countries like Iceland with a strong tradition for reading, the 
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youth read less and less.” As if this was not enough, Snævarr rolls out 
heavy artillery in the form of studies which show that people in the West 
watch television on average 21 hours a week, or that youngsters spend 
as much as “twenty-five to thirty hours a week in front of the television 
or computer.”11 This, and an implicit premise that the latter media do not 
have much to do with the written word, allow him to claim that “[t]hey 
[i.e. youngsters] simply do not have time to read.”12 
My rejoinder to the above is rather simple and boils down to stressing 
that, according to various studies, the “Internet overtakes TV time,”13 and 
that the World Wide Web is generally a textual environment. This latter 
claim is very easily proven, for instance, by the trivial fact that no mat-
ter which website one wants to visit, one usually has to type its address, 
and even if one does not have to do it (because one, e.g., follows a link), 
one must still be able to read the address or the description of the page. 
To continue with such banalities, even if the only thing one wants to use 
the Internet for is watching videos on YouTube, one still has to enter the 
name of a given video to find it (not to mention the fact that an import-
ant part of the entertainment provided by YouTube is posting and read-
ing comments on particular clips). We should not forget, too, that one 
of the most popular phenomena in the Internet are the so-called blogs, 
i.e., electronic diaries accessible to the general public, and even though 
there exist also the so-called video blogs, the ordinary, i.e. written and 
read, blogs dominate.14 And what about the fact that the content of thou-
sands of newspapers, magazines, journals (including the one in which 
Snævarr’s criticism of Shusterman was published), and of thousands of 
books are to be found on the web, and are read in that form by millions? 
I also hope that Snævarr, and other people who are prone to associate the 
alleged decline of the printed word with the demise of literature, have 
heard that legions of authors publish their own poetry and imaginative 
fiction on the Internet, and still more people read it. It is also signifi-
cant that the web, and electronic media in general, have stimulated the 
emergence of various new forms of literary writing, usually subsumed 
under the label of electronic literature.15 In other words, one simply can-
not ignore the fact that the Internet has its own literacy16 which consti-
tutes one of its core elements. The surveys Snævarr quotes do not take 
this phenomenon fully into account and unless they do, they cannot be 
treated seriously. In an article published in the online edition of Forbes in 
2006, and tellingly entitled “How The Internet Saved The Literacy,” one 
can read that the results of various surveys that tried to show “a negative 
correlation between Internet use and reading” (including one of those 
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cited by Snævarr) are now thought to be “unduly alarmist, according to 
several experts in the field.” Interestingly it seems that the Internet is not 
only harmless to reading in general, but also when it comes to the seem-
ingly endangered textual species, such as the book. After all, “the sale of 
books has continued to trend upward over the past several years … [e.g.] 
in 2005, sales jumped 9.9%, to $25 billion, according to the Association of 
American Publishers.”17 In a more general way, it is also crucial to notice 
that according to the statistical estimates provided by UNESCO (which 
one can very easily find on the Internet, by the way),18 in the last few 
decades, i.e. the age of television and computer, the illiteracy rate in the 
world has decreased, statistically, by almost 20%. In this light, I think that 
Snævarr’s talk of the “triumph” of visual culture,19 which is supposedly 
threatening not only our capacity to read or write, but also our “abilities 
to engage in argumentation” in general should be put among fairytales, 
euphemistically speaking.20
(b) Threat to high culture: I would like to begin with a general remark 
that in his article, Snævarr does not provide any clear definition of high, 
and popular, culture (limiting himself to giving vague descriptions, or 
some examples, thereof), which I think is a serious methodological mis-
take that gets him into trouble in the course of his argument. After all, 
the high/popular distinction is not in itself unambiguous, as is evidenced 
by the existence of several, often mutually incompatible, understandings 
thereof.21 Obviously, one might object that the question about the nature 
of this distinction is in a way analogous to St. Augustine’s Quid est ergo 
tempus? to which he famously responded: “If no one asks me, I know 
what it is. If I wish to explain it to him who asks me, I do not know.”22 
In short, one might say that this is a theoretical question which does not 
apply to our usage of those terms in the practical life, where we can use 
them without any problems, just as we can deploy the word time being 
completely unaware of the theoretical intricacies and pitfalls of its mean-
ing. And is Snævarr’s case not a practical one, after all? But such an anal-
ogy would be inadequate, and his not defining what he understands by 
these terms seriously affects the force of Snævarr’s argumentation.23 For 
instance, what does it mean when Snævarr, in order to prove that high 
culture is in retreat, claims that it has become “more difficult to sell serious 
books”? What kind of criterion is that? As if to clarify the issue, Snævarr 
cites a complaint by one German publisher that 20 years ago one could 
sell 20,000 copies of a book “like the essays of George Steiner,” while now 
the sales are limited to, more or less, 9000.24 But that does not explain 
what a serious book is: does it have to be erudite, interdisciplinary, or 
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sophisticated in style, as Steiner’s works are? (By the way, we must not 
preclude the possibility that some die-hard analytic philosophers could 
say that books like Steiner’s are not serious at all. And this is exactly 
because their authors take sloppy thinkers like Hei degger too seriously). 
I am also wondering what Snævarr would say about Harry Frankfurt’s 
On Bullshit. Just to remind you, this small book, despite its seemingly 
insouciant title, is not bullshit itself, but a witty philosophical essay, and, 
most importantly, it has sold at least 175,000 copies in the US alone.25 
Would Snævarr dismiss it as an isolated example, or maybe would want 
to prove that this is not a serious book at all? 
Similar doubts are raised by another feature Snævarr seems to be at-
tributing to high culture, namely that it is “demanding.” According to 
Snævarr, one of the alleged symptoms of the decline of that culture is 
the fact that sales of classical music have decreased, and that “we can-
not rule out the possibility that the ever-present pop music is vaccinat-
ing the young against the more demanding classical music.”26 But what 
can one make of this claim? After all, the present musical culture in the 
West is not rigidly divided into the aficionados of Chopin, Schönberg, 
etc., on one side, and the ever growing horde of the rabid fans of Brit-
ney Spears or Madonna, on the other. Is classical music, then, the only 
reservoir of demanding music? And what about artists such as Antony 
and the Johnsons, Nick Cave, Björk, Interpol; what about post-rock bands 
like Mogwai, Godspeed You! Black Emperor [sic]; what about progressive 
rock, punk, alternative electronica and industrial (e.g. the German band 
Einstürzende Neubauten), and other genres which many young people 
are keen on? Are all of these undemanding products of pop music, too? 
Or maybe they belong to classi cal music? And if they are, in fact, demand-
ing, can they be labeled as high culture? Where is their place within the di-
chotomy Snævarr sketches? I believe that the above examples sufficiently 
demonstrate that until Snævarr clarifies what he means by the high/low 
culture distinction, his respective claims are hard to be taken seriously. 
(c) Threat to communal living: here, the gist of Snævarr’s argument 
is to blame electronic media, such as TV, the Internet, and computer, 
for bringing about “the culture of autism,” in which “civic activities” dis-
appear and “social isolation” reigns supreme. Now, again, I hope that 
Snævarr realizes that when one sits in front of the computer “absorbed 
… by Internet surfing,” one is not necessarily “completely alone”27 even 
if nobody else is physically present in the room. After all, one may well 
be exchanging emails, or talking via various Internet communicators, 
with other people, or playing multi-player computer games with any of 
Pragmatist Aesthetics, the New Literacy, and Popular Culture
61
the millions of online gamers around the world. Such trivialities aside, 
we must bear in mind that among the most popular Internet phenom-
ena are the so-called social networking websites, such as Facebook and 
My Space.28 Thanks to these, millions of people are not only able to com-
municate with each other, but also in a sense expand the potential range 
of their contacts farther than it was possible ever before (e.g. by join-
ing international Internet communities devoted to various pursuits and 
goals, political ones among them), something which may compensate for 
the fact that other forms of social life may be disappearing.29 Of course, 
one can always cling tightly to some conservative understanding of what 
the latter is, focusing exclusively on its old, petrified forms, and not real-
ize, or not want to realize, that there may be any alternatives to them. 
Then, by definition, social networking websites and other enterprises 
the netizens engage in, would not count as real communal life; just as 
signing Internet petitions, Internet voting, or sending alarming emails to 
one’s local politician, etc. would not be worthy of the dignifying label of 
“civic activity.” I believe, however, that anyone who was to profess such 
a view would sooner or later be condemned to “social isolation” them-
selves. For instance, how could one ignore the fact that the competition 
between Hilary Clinton and Barack Obama in 2008 was to an important 
extent decided on the Internet?30 
II
Having challenged some of Snævarr’s empirical claims, let me turn to 
his account of Shusterman’s aesthetics. My critical arguments may be 
divided into two groups: charges of misinterpretation, and of omission. 
As far as the question of misinterpretation is concerned, let us begin 
with the following quote from Snævarr’s article:
To make matters worse, he [i.e. Shusterman] extrapolates in an unjustifiable 
manner from rock and rap to all forms of popular culture. He objectifies the 
concept of popular art; he argues that such disparate phenomena as rap music 
and TV soap operas share a common essence. He does not see that though rap 
music might liberate our bodies, watching TV soaps all day certainly does not. 
Actually, this implicit essentialism goes against the grain of his skepticism 
toward the objectification of concepts. So there are not only empirical but also 
logical deficiencies in Shusterman’s argumentation.31
It is clear from the above, that Snævarr misconceives the main idea be-
hind Shusterman’s writings on popular art. In a nutshell, the latter’s pro-
ject aims primarily at providing aesthetic legitimation for popular art 
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against those critics who think that this kind of art by its very nature does 
not, and cannot, possess any aesthetic value whatsoever.32 In order to 
refute this presumption Shusterman does not need to argue that popular 
art is intrinsically valuable, something which, being an anti-essentialist, 
he indeed explicitly rejects.33 Instead, it would suffice, at least from a 
logical point of view, to provide counterexamples showing that there ac-
tually exist phenomena which the critics in question would be ready to 
categorize as popular art, but which at the same time represent aesthetic 
qualities that, according to those critics, such art cannot represent. And 
Shusterman does exactly that. For instance, pace authors who think that 
popular art can provide only spurious or “washed out” aesthetic pleas-
ures, Shusterman argues that “the experience of rock music … can be 
so intensely absorbing and powerful that it is likened to spiritual pos-
session.”34 Similarly, he undermines the accusation of the alleged passiv-
ity of the reception of popular art by pointing to those of its forms which 
demand real physical effort from their public and are therefore capable 
of “liberating” our bodies.35 These and other examples serve nothing 
more, and nothing less, than showing that popular art can have certain 
aesthetic qualities. That surely does not entail the essentialism Snævarr 
accuses Shusterman of, namely a belief that all forms of popular art do 
possess those qualities. Here we see very clearly that Snævarr either has 
not read Shusterman’s works thoroughly, or it is he, rather than the latter, 
who has problems with logical thinking.
Equally problematic are Snævarr’s claims that Shusterman is “blowing 
a fanfare for the common man …”36 or that Shusterman believes that “the 
entertainment industry speaks on behalf of the common man.”37 First of 
all, Shusterman is not blowing any fanfare for anybody, since, being faith-
ful to his melioristic approach (which Snævarr, by the way, does mention 
in the article), he is recognizing both virtues and vices of popular art in 
general, and of its specific genres, such as rap, in particular.38 Moreover, 
anyone who has read the very texts Snævarr criticizes, knows quite well 
that Shusterman explicitly rejects the depiction of the audience of popu-
lar art as a homogenized aggregate, representing some average taste. As a 
consequence, instead of talking about “mass audience” of popular art he 
prefers to talk about its “multitudinous audiences,” each of which repre-
sents different tastes, levels of education, or economic backgrounds.39 This 
approach surely makes any talk of “the common man” with regard to his 
views on popular culture simply absurd. 
Let us take another example. Snævarr claims baldly that “… Shusterman 
is wrong about entertainment being something relaxing. By implication 
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there is no such thing as higher learning provided by entertainment’s 
purported relaxing effect.” And this is allegedly because “more often 
than not entertainment is a stimulant rather than a means for relaxation. 
(Do kids really relax while playing an exciting computer game and lis-
tening to loud rock and roll?)”40 Yet these arguments miss the point of 
Shusterman’s account of entertainment. In his article “Entertainment: A 
Question for Aesthetics” (to which Snævarr refers in his criticism), Shus-
terman sets out to defend the value of entertainment – which is denied 
by many thinkers, ranging from Plato to Hannah Arendt – by explaining 
its specific dialectic. In order to do so, Shusterman, among other things, 
provides an etymological analysis of various terms referring to the no-
tion of entertainment in the English language (as well as in French and 
German), such as, e.g., “entertainment,” “diversion,” and “distraction.” The 
former term need not bother us here, but the latter two, Shusterman 
argues, point to a very important function of entertainment; namely, di-
verting or distracting us from our main or “habitual” occupation. It is 
thanks to this function that we can “relax” our minds and bodies, which, 
quite naturally, become tired and strained when focused narrowly on 
one activity or object for too long.41 Now, this general account implies 
that anything can be a form of entertainment, provided it serves this 
distracting function at a given moment and for a given person; which 
means also that no particular activity is, in and of itself, a form of enter-
tainment, regardless of the context in which it appears. Now we can see 
why examples given by Snævarr (of children who spend so much time 
playing games or watching TV, to which they are “addicted,” that they 
suffer from ADHD and other problems) do not refute, but rather con-
firm Shusterman’s conception of entertainment.42 This is because when 
a given entertaining occupation, such as playing computer games or 
watching TV, becomes one’s habitual activity – something on which one 
concentrates through most of one’s time – it by definition ceases to be 
entertainment as it loses its distracting, relaxing function. Importantly, 
in the case of computer games, this loss has nothing to do with their 
being exciting and stimulating, because excitement and stimulation do 
not necessarily preclude relaxation (as Snævarr apparently thinks they 
do). In order to understand that, let us once again refer to Shusterman’s 
theory of the productive dialectic of entertainment. If, for instance, one’s 
principal occupation is rather boring and bland, then one will quite like-
ly be diverted, or entertained, and thus relaxed, by something exciting 
and stimulating. Besides, if one can relax by playing an exciting tennis 
match with a friend (which is one of Shusterman’s own examples of an 
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entertaining activity, and which I think even Snævarr would not have 
doubts about), then why can one not relax by having wild fun at a rock 
concert or playing an engaging computer game? 
Now, let me turn to omissions. First of all, it is a bit of an exagger-
ation to say that Shusterman “tends to ignore” the side of popular culture 
Snævarr is bothered with. Namely, the new electronic visual media and 
their possible negative impact on our lives; e.g., that they make us unfit 
or over-stimulated, or may turn us away from other valuable media, such 
as books. Of course, I admit that Shusterman does not talk explicitly 
about visual culture’s threat to reading and to verbal communication as 
such. Yet, in my opinion, one really cannot make that into an objection, 
since the threat is illusionary, as I have argued above. 
Be that as it may, it is worth noting that in one of Shusterman’s works 
which Snævarr refers to, one can find an essay “Somaesthetics and the 
body/media issue,” which Snævarr strangely does not mention, even 
though he should, given the specific perspective of his criticism. There, 
Shusterman not only talks about “coach-potato media consumption” that 
is often contrasted with the active, healthy life of fitness aficionados,43 
but is also able to present that dichotomy in a far more subtle and use-
ful way than the one implicit in Snævarr’s text. In that very same essay 
Shusterman discusses the tension between the “new media” (television, 
the Internet, computers) and the older ones, such as “the book,” and ex-
plicitly urges that there are good reasons (even if these are not the same 
reasons Snævarr gives) for us not to neglect at least some of the older 
ones in favor of the inventions of our electronic age.44 Moreover, he ex-
plicitly talks there about “the time wasting nonsense of TV” and “the 
disruptive intrusion” of other contemporary media.45 Does all that sound 
like “ignoring” the questions Snævarr is talking about, such as, e.g., the 
condition of books in today’s world, the negative influence of television, 
overstimulation, or lack of physical fitness? Let me also stress that Shus-
terman’s treatment of the latter two problems is not limited to just one 
essay. In fact, somaesthetics, a philosophical discipline he created at least 
ten years ago and has been developing ever since, quite often addresses 
the question of how “the newer electronic media” affect our bodily exis-
tence, often generating various somatic or psychosomatic ailments and 
malfunctionings.46 
Now let me turn to Snævarr’s claim that Shusterman “does not quite 
grasp the fact that hedonism has prevailed. He apparently thinks that 
Puritanism is still a problem in the Western world like it was before 
the 1960s.”47 There is no denying that Shusterman denounces critics of 
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popular culture such as Adorno and Allan Bloom as being too “ascetic,”48 
but he surely does not extrapolate this charge to Western culture en bloc. 
Suffice it to mention the following quotation from his Performing Live: 
“Hedonism may have always been with us, but it has become more out-
spoken in secular postmodernity.”49 What is more, in one of his essays on 
Foucault, Shusterman provides an extended critique of a certain kind of 
hedonism which he thinks is predominant in our culture. Namely the he-
donism which concentrates solely on seeking intense, extreme pleasures 
and, as a consequence, generates the problem of overstimulation.50 
III
Finally, I would like to explain why I believe Shusterman’s pragmatist aes-
thetics to be one of today’s most efficient theoretical approaches to the 
so-called popular culture even though it has its limitations and defects (al-
beit not the ones Snævarr is talking about), some of which I pointed out 
elsewhere.51 To begin with, it is worth emphasizing that in Snævarr’s essay 
there is no single mention, let alone any detailed proposal, of any concrete, 
feasible solution to the problems he tackles, but only complaint and dark 
prophecies. Irrespective of whether he does differently in his other texts, 
that particular approach is something which characterizes the bulk of criti-
cisms leveled at popular culture, and it is against exactly this background 
that the value Shusterman’s endeavor can be seen the most clearly. 
One of the most important principles of pragmatism is that we must 
begin from where we are and always try to use the resources and tools 
available to us, here and now, in order to make things better. Now, it is 
definitely true that most of the students we encounter today (and will 
encounter in the future) are saturated by the so-called popular culture in 
its visual, audible, and all other possible guises, and thus they may have 
problems with understanding, let alone enjoying, many particular forms 
and canonical works of literature and other arts. Well, what can we do in 
such a situation? Should we try to ban popular culture or restrict their 
access to it? And how could we do that? Then maybe we should try to 
convince those youngsters that what they cherish most and what consti-
tutes such an important part of their identity is essentially evil and must 
be rejected? Again, how could that be achieved? Interestingly, the roots 
of Shusterman’s theory are to be found in his own pedagogical experi-
ences and in his attempts to face similar questions. As he has explained 
in interviews and a preface to one of his books, his conversion to prag-
matist aesthetics took place in “1988, when [he] taught a … [postgraduate] 
seminar” on aesthetics at Temple University. The students who attended 
Wojciech Małecki
66
it had come mostly “from working class backgrounds” with their tastes 
having been shaped by television and pop music, while Shusterman at 
the time was a follower of Adornian aesthetics, and thus himself a critic 
of popular art. It was then when he realized, having seen the reaction of 
his students to his unshaken condemnation of their favorite forms of art, 
that such a condescending approach is not a solution. That in order to in-
troduce students to the kinds of art they are unfamiliar with, one should 
not stress differences in an oppressive way, but rather show connections 
and be open to dialogue.52 In this light, we should ask ourselves: Why 
not think about the ways in which popular culture, and its visual sub-
set in particular, might enhance aesthetic education? Why not yoke its 
specific phenomena to the purpose of refining students’ aesthetic taste 
and hermeneutical skills? Why not use popular art forms to make the 
students think about the issues we think are important? Shusterman’s 
works make us realize this possibility and show how to do it (e.g. when 
he situates rap within the debate over the political function of art).53 As 
far as his own pedagogical practice is concerned, Shusterman confesses 
that his classes have sometimes taken place in venues as unusual as 
dance and techno clubs, and he himself proves that the experiences one 
can get from attending the latter can indeed be a source of interesting 
aesthetic reflection. And he does so, for instance, by providing an insight-
ful essay on the aesthetics of cities, which begins with an autobiographi-
cal narrative of his having attended a techno club in Berlin, where the 
idea of the essay was conceived. That place, quite obviously, was shaking 
with the sound of techno music (which Snævarr would surely condemn 
as intellectually undemanding), and was also full of “flashing lights” and 
videos “projected” on the walls (obvious examples of destructive visual 
culture). Yet its aesthetic dimension somehow allowed Shusterman to 
understand the peculiar aesthetics of absence that characterizes Berlin, 
and to propose a new interpretation of subtle and demanding thinkers 
such as Walter Benjamin.54
To continue with the question of the practical value of Shusterman’s 
approach, let me admit that it may well be the case that teachers of aes-
thetic education, e.g. dance teachers, are often confronted with children 
who suffer from overstimulation or are so obese that it makes it quite 
difficult to teach them not only dancing, but a lot of other things too. 
But does that mean that the case is lost completely? Surely not, and it 
is worth mentioning that Shusterman discusses how his somaesthetics 
may contribute to alleviating various bodily problems (not necessarily 
media-related) which can significantly hamper one’s education process, 
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and also how it may facilitate aesthetic education in particular by im-
proving one’s control and consciousness of the body (necessary for mas-
tering the art of dance, e.g.) and the capacity for aesthetic experience.55
To return to the aforementioned account of the media proposed by 
Shusterman, its usefulness lies partly in that it reminds us that “every 
medium or technique – radio, television, video, film, books – has its ad-
vantages and limitations, encouraging certain perceptions, experiences, 
or constructions and hindering others.”56 Of course, one could say that 
this is obvious and no one really needs to be reminded of such trivialities, 
but Snævarr himself can be a very good counterexample here. He seems 
to be so concentrated on the positivity of the textual and the scourge 
of the visual, that he falls into a kind of graphocentrism, which is ex-
pressed, e.g., by the fact that he apparently cannot imagine any form of 
aesthetic education that could make good use of the students’ excellent 
knowledge of electronic visual culture, or that could go without “writing 
essays” for that matter. Let me also note in passing that the rigid textual/
visual distinction Snævarr seems to be attached to, is problematic indeed, 
as Shusterman himself proves eloquently in an article entitled “Deep 
Theory and Surface Blindness: On the Aesthetic Visibility of Print.”57
It is also worth stressing that Shusterman’s theory of the media, just 
as his philosophy and aesthetics in general, is thoroughly historicist, and 
thereby lets us understand that no form of art, no particular genre, and 
no medium, is bound to stay forever, and that the existence of none of 
them in particular is necessary for art as such, or high art and culture 
for that matter, to thrive (even if, at the same time, it might be advan-
tageous if we could preserve all of them). Shusterman is thus properly 
flexible, where Snævarr seems to be overly rigid and conservative, which 
conservatism distorts his view of reality. For instance, why think that 
the decline of classical music is equivalent to the decline of intellectu-
ally demanding or high forms of music? What if classical music, with 
the particular set of instruments it prefers, particular mode of reception 
etc. simply outlived its artistic potential, and we should be ready to bid 
it farewell sooner or later? After all, we know from the history of music 
that some of its high forms have disappeared from existence, along with 
particular instruments and composing patterns, and yet nothing detri-
mental has happened to intellectually demanding music as such (which 
of course does not mean that these forms cannot regain their importance 
one day). If we are unwilling to take seriously the possibility that some 
other forms of music, and art in general, are undergoing analogous pro-
cesses right now, we may unwittingly make aesthetic education into a 
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bulwark of artistic reactionism, which is certainly something better to 
be avoided.
The last of the positive aspects of Shusterman’s aesthetics of popular 
art that I would like to talk about in this article is in a way related to 
Snævarr’s ironic remark that
… he [i.e. Shusterman] seems to think that the high brows still rule. But the only 
place to find bona fide intellectual snobs these days is in the Frasier sitcom; 
nonvirtual high brows virtually disappeared in the 1960s, the decade during 
which hedonism triumphed. Interestingly enough, most of the high brows 
Shusterman criticizes wrote their books before the advent of the Beatles. So 
his criticism of the puritans and the high brows seems a bit dated.58
Have the highbrows really disappeared from the scene? And what about 
Harold Bloom who, just a few years ago, thundered from the height of 
his academic reputation of a famous Yale critic that the united forces 
of Stephen King and J. K. Rowling are “dumbing down American read-
ers”?59 Or what about the acclaimed novelist A. S. Byatt who said more 
or less the same, and more or less at the same time, about Harry Potter in 
an op-ed for The New York Times?60 And the general criticisms of popu-
lar culture professed by the likes of Finkielkraut, Scruton, or Hoggart? 
These surely were not written in the 1960’s.61 The list could go on, but 
what interests me here are not such counterexamples, but rather what 
really lies behind the apparent retreat of highbrows and the triumph of 
popular culture. In order to clarify what I mean, let me refer to the fol-
lowing quotation from Didier Maleuvre’s review of Shusterman’s Prag-
matist aesthetics, which contains a charge of anachronism that is analog-
ous to the one formulated by Snævarr:
In his zeal to justify popular art against stuffed-shirt academia, Shusterman is 
guilty of setting up straw men: he has to dig out highbrow fogeys from half a 
century ago, or notorious curmudgeons like Adorno, to find voices still railing 
against popular art forms. Whereas a glance at contemporary academic pub-
lishing or college course catalogues would have informed him that the case of 
popular arts scarcely needs championing.62
On the first look, one could hardly disagree with Maleuvre. After all, does 
the epidemic of popular culture studies not mean that this culture has 
gained a respectable position in the realm of the academia, banishing 
the last survivors of highbrow criticism? And is it not the case that 
rappers like Jay-Z, singers like Shakira, authors like Stephen King and 
J. K. Rowling, and many other pop icons, are now allowed to compete 
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for the spiritual leadership in the classrooms on the same rules as John 
Milton and William Blake?63 Moreover, one could find similar opin-
ions even among Shusterman’s fellow-pragmatists. For instance John J. 
Stuhr points out that now we can observe a peculiar way of pursuing the 
humanities, i.e., “the humanities as entertainment.” And that
celebrity humanist scholars who now write learned essays about Madonna and 
feminist theory, Michael Jackson and the politics of desire, Cindy Crawford 
and late capitalist productions of style, Axl Rose and the politics of diminished 
expectations, and “NYPD Blues” and postmodern communication, are the van-
guard of this movement.64
But all this is in fact the grist for Shusterman’s mill, which becomes quite 
clear as soon as we take a closer look at the curriculum, as Maleuvre ad-
vises us to do, or at Stuhr’s very own examples. Having done so we must 
conclude that, in the academic circles, popular art (which is the aspect 
of popular culture Shusterman primarily concentrates on) very often 
serves as mere pretext for sociopolitical debates taking place under the 
banner of cultural studies. This whole phenomenon, in fact, is situated 
on the opposite pole of what Shusterman argues for, i.e. analysis, study, 
and teaching of popular art, which, albeit not neglecting the sociopoliti-
cal aspects of particular works, puts sufficient emphasis on their artistic 
character and is supposed to contribute to the general improvement of 
the aesthetic quality of popular art. 
To sum up, I hope to have demonstrated that both Snævarr’s account 
of popular culture, as well as his interpretation of Shusterman’s aesthet-
ics can be questioned, and that there are several aspects of the latter’s 
thought that may be of value for the contemporary aesthetic education. I 
would like to finish the article by referring to yet another question which 
bothers me in Snævarr’s criticism, namely the rhetoric he employs in 
talking about Shusterman as an author. For instance, when characterizing 
Shusterman’s overall project, Snævarr makes the following claim: “It is 
not by chance that he [i.e. Shusterman] defends popular culture; after all, 
he is one of the few aestheticians today who enjoys some popularity.”65 
Now what can that supposedly mean? If this is an empirical claim to 
the effect that Shusterman defends popular culture somehow because 
he himself is popular then it is rather dubious, because Shusterman in 
fact conceived and presented his main idea of the defense of popular 
culture before he became popular. In fact, one might say that Shuster-
man became internationally famous partly because of his defense of 
popular culture, and now he is not so much defending it (although this 
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happens, too), but rather showing in which aspects it needs to be cor-
rected, e.g., as far as visual representations of the body are concerned. Or 
maybe Snævarr is here trying to accuse Shusterman of a certain kind of 
cynicism (he is doing all that only to defend the culture he is a part of )? 
Then that would not only be dubious but rather ungenerous, too. I am 
equally troubled by Snævarr’s awkwardly condescending remark, which 
concludes his article. Namely, that despite “not only empirical but also 
logical deficiencies in Shusterman’s argumentation … he is a very inter-
esting philosopher, young enough to improve his analyses and cultural 
comments.”66 Given the tone of this latter remark I may be excused for 
expressing the hope, in conclusion, that Stefán Snævarr will be ready to 
improve his own analyses and cultural comments, too.67
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